The Big One by Parson, Edward A.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Reviews Faculty Scholarship 
2007 
The Big One 
Edward A. Parson 
University of Michigan Law School, parson@law.ucla.edu 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews/72 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Science and 
Technology Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Parson, Edward A.. "The Big One." Review of Catastrophe: Risk and Response, by R. A. Posner. J. Econ. 
Literature 45, no. 1 (2007): 147-64. 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Reviews by an authorized administrator of 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
Journal of Economie Literature 
Vol XLV (March 2007), pp. 147-164 
The Big One: A Review of 
Richard Posner s Catastrophe: 
Risk and Response 
Edward A. Parson* 
Richard Posners Catastrophe: Risk and Response (Oxford University Press, 2004) 
examines four risks whose worst cases could end advanced human civilization or 
worse: asteroid impacts, a catastrophic chain reaction initiated in high-energy parti 
cle accelerators, global climate change, and bioterrorism. He argues that these all 
warrant more thought and response than they are receiving, and that they can use 
fully be assessed using a simple analytic framework based on cost-benefit analysis. 
This essay reviews knowledge of these risks and critically examines Posners claims for 
a consistent analytic approach. While the conclusions that each risk merits more 
thought and effort appear persuasive, these rely on ad hoc arguments specific to each 
risk. The general analytic claims do not hold up well, as Posner develops his proposed 
framework thinly and applies it unevenly. Applying such a framework consistently to 
catastrophic risks would require engaging some fundamental problems that Posner 
does not address. The book's major contributions are to identify and describe these 
risks, highlight the inadequate attention they are receiving, and advance a persuasive 
argument for their more serious examination. 
1. Introduction 
Despite 
the epidemic of anxiety that 
afflicts modern life, few people appear to 
spare any attention to worry about the biggest 
things. How might the world end? Those 
interested in this question are most likely to 
frame it in religious terms?but what about 
secular apocalypse? Are there known physical 
or biological mechanisms that could end life 
as we know it? And, if so, what are they and 
what, if anything, can we do about them? 
Parson: University of Michigan. I thank Roger 
Gordon, Don Herzog, Jim Hines, Jill Horwitz, and Kyle 
Logue for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 
If you don't have enough to worry about, 
or if you want to worry on a larger scale, this 
book?by the astonishingly prolific appeals 
judge, law professor, and amateur economist 
Richard Posner?is for you. Posner thinks 
big. He is concerned with catastrophic risks, 
those that in their worst case could end 
advanced civilization, all of humanity, or life 
on earth. He asks what we know about 
potentially catastrophic risks, how we should 
think about them, and what we should do 
about them. 
What are these risks? Posner identifies 
four 
categories?natural catastrophes, scien 
tific accidents, unintended consequences of 
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Gordon, Don Herzog, Jim Hines, Jill HOlwitz, and Kyle 
Logne for helpful co ments on earlier drafts. 
If you don't have enough to worry about, 
or if you want to worry on a larger scale, this 
book-by the astonishingly prolific appeals 
judge, law professor, and amateur ec nomist 
Richard Posner-is for you. Posner thinks 
big. He is concerned with catastrophic risks, 
those that in their worst case could end 
advanced civilization, all of humanity, or life 
on earth. He asks what we know about 
potentially catastrophic risks, how we should 
think about them, and what we should do 
about them. 
147 
What are these risks? Posner identifies 
four categories-natural catastrophes, scien-
tific accidents, unintended consequences of 
148 Journal of Economie Literature, Vol. XLV (March 2007) 
productive human activity, and intentional 
catastrophes, created by malevolent human 
agency?and outlines, to varying degrees of 
detail, several risks that fall into each catego 
ry. Most of these he quickly dismisses, either 
because they are not big enough to count as 
true 
catastrophes (e.g., earthquakes, volca 
noes, natural pandemics, and biodiversity 
loss) or because decades of scientific advance 
would be needed to turn them into real 
threats (e.g., omnivorous self-replicating 
nano-machines, or super-intelligent machines 
attacking or enslaving humans), although he 
keeps these around long enough to reveal a 
fondness for postapocalyptic fiction. Early 
chapters include detailed and affectionate 
accounts of two futuristic nightmares, the 
human-enslaving machines in the film "the 
Matrix," and the post-climate-catastrophe 
society in Margaret Atwoods novel Oryx and 
Crake. 
Four catastrophic risks remain, one in 
each category: asteroid impacts, a hypothet 
ical particle-accelerator accident called the 
"strangelet scenario," global climate change, 
and bioterrorism. Posner provides fairly 
detailed summaries of present knowledge of 
each, and proposes countermeasures. His 
broadest aim is to corral these risks into 
some common mode of 
reasoning, to pursue 
general insights and a rational approach to 
management. At this high level of generality, 
he makes four claims: 
1. All these risks are likely enough to war 
rant serious examination, and some are 
growing more likely. 
2. They 
are not getting attention commen 
surate with their severity, partly due to 
known psychological, cultural, and social 
factors that make it hard to think clearly 
about them. 
3. Despite their extreme and unprecedent 
ed character, these risks can usefully be 
examined with a simple analytic frame 
work based on cost-benefit 
analysis, 
even if estimates of probabilities and 
consequences are only wide bounds 
or 
slightly informed speculation. 
4. Applying these analytic tools suggests 
that we should be doing substantially 
more to avert these risks than we are. 
Be forewarned. The book is full of irrita 
tions, eccentricities, and vanities, with signs 
of extreme haste everywhere. It is a mess of 
facts and ideas?good and bad, relevant and 
irrelevant, supported and unsupported, and 
nearly all half-baked at best. The organiza 
tion is terrible, filled with multiple repeti 
tions, odd topic jumps, and apparently 
random digressions. Seemingly arbitrary and 
unsupported opinions appear frequently, 
such as a 
strange rant on how creators of 
computer viruses should serve at least five 
years prison time. So also do irritating didac 
tic tutorials on elementary analytic points: 
here are a few paragraphs on discounting, 
here are a few on how to generate chaotic 
behavior from a simple quadratic difference 
equation. The assembly of material from 
other sources, particularly the summaries of 
scientific knowledge of his four risks, is so 
undigested that extended passages read like 
an 
unprocessed summary of 
sources pre 
pared by a team of research assistants. 
And yet, every ten pages or so, there are a 
few paragraphs where Posner seems to start 
paying attention, and you see the applica 
tion of a sharp, restless intelligence?still 
thinking on the fly, but now making coher 
ent and provocative arguments. The large 
scale 
arguments and proposals for action, 
while roughly drawn, are in some instances 
persuasive?and refreshingly challenging, 
not least in the glee with which they cut 
across ideological lines. There is plenty of 
food for thought here. 
Such haste, breadth, and fondness for 
provocation are all part of Posner's modus 
operandi, but it is neither interesting nor use 
ful to catalog all the resultant small-scale 
faults. Rather, one must step back to view the 
large-scale argument and recommendations, 
and ask how well these survive the thousand 
underlying defects. Unsurprisingly, the ver 
dict is mixed. To engage these arguments, 
however, it is necessary to know something 
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about the risks. Information about these is 
spread through much of the book, which is a 
shame since these are in many ways the most 
interesting parts. Here follows a condensed 
and organized summary. 
2. Four Catastrophic Risks 
Of the four risks, Asteroid impacts are the 
only one whose probability distribution of 
harms can be objectively estimated by track 
ing the space objects that are big and close 
enough to threaten the Earth and by observ 
ing the results of past impacts on the Earth 
and Moon. The inventory of potentially haz 
ardous asteroids (PHAs)?defined as those 
with diameter 1 kilometer or larger, and 
whose orbits can bring them within 7.5 mil 
lion kilometers of the Earth (about 5 percent 
of the Earth-Sun distance or twenty times 
the Earth-Moon distance)?is actively 
growing, and so already substantially larger 
than when Posner wrote in early 2004. 
There are estimated to be perhaps 200-250 
PHAs, of which 159 have been catalogued. If 
you expand the count to include objects that 
are either smaller or more distant, the num 
bers grow sharply: there are 773 catalogued 
objects this close if you count all that are 
bigger than 100 meters, while there are 836 
this big (1-kilometer-plus) if you count all 
those that pass within a larger band around 
the Earth's orbit (within 30 percent of the 
Earth-Sun distance). The PHAs?those that 
are both big and close?are the most impor 
tant. The 159 of these that have been found 
include nine that might be 5 kilometers or 
larger, of which the largest might be roughly 
8 kilometers1?close, given the uncertainty 
involved, to the 10-kilometer size believed to 
have caused the great extinctions of 65 and 
250 million years ago. A 10-kilometer 
1 The size of these objects is inferred from their bright 
ness, and has substantial uncertainty. The nine are those 
with absolute magnitude (H) < 15.0, of which the bright 
est has H = 14.1. H = 15.0 corresponds to diameter 3-6 
km, 14.0 to 4-9 km. (Data from NASA's Near Earth Object 
Program, at neo.jpl.nasa.gov, accessed May 22, 2006). 
impact, estimated to occur every 50 to 100 
million years, would kill most or all people 
on Earth through the combined effects of 
fire, shockwave, tsunamis, and several years' 
obstruction of sunlight. Smaller asteroids 
strike more often and cause less destruction: 
how much less depends both on their size 
and composition, and on where they strike. 
Proceeding from largest to smallest, one to 
two-kilometer strikes occur once every 
100,000 to one million years, and might 
destroy an area of half a million square kilo 
meters (e.g., California or France) if they hit 
land. An ocean strike would cause hemi 
spheric or global tsunamis, making the 
destruction greater and more widespread. 
Objects of -100 meters strike every few 
thousand years, destroying the area of a large 
city. The most recent significant impact 
occurred in Siberia in 1908, a ~50-meter 
asteroid that exploded in the air and released 
about the energy of a small hydrogen bomb 
(~ 1-2 megatons), destroying a 50-kilometer 
circle of forest. Impacts of this size occur 
once every few centuries. Finally, 10-meter 
asteroids strike the Earth more than once a 
year, making upper-atmosphere explosions 
the size of early atomic bombs, roughly 20 
kilotons. Summing the estimated risks from 
all asteroid impacts gives an expected 1,000 
to 10,000 deaths per year, almost all of them 
from the largest and rarest events. 
The one risk that could destroy the Earth 
even more thoroughly than a large asteroid 
arises from a series of events, called the 
"strangelet scenario," that could be trig 
gered by heavy nuclei colliding in high 
power particle accelerators. The products of 
such collisions can include subatomic parti 
cles called strange quarks. If particles con 
taining strange quarks (called "strangelets") 
are stable and negatively charged (both 
believed highly unlikely), they will approach 
and fuse with nearby nuclei, converting 
some of their matter to strange quarks and 
yielding a larger strangelet. If the strangelet 
remains stable and negatively charged as it 
grows (also believed highly unlikely), the 
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process will continue until it runs out of 
nearby matter?reducing the Earth and 
everything on it to a hyperdense sphere of 
strange matter roughly 100 meters across. 
The sphere would immediately explode like 
a stellar supernova, not that we would care 
at that point. The essence of this risk is that 
it is a chain reaction, by which some foreign 
form of matter assimilates and transforms 
the normal form. Such chain reactions are 
known in protein folding (including the 
development of prion diseases such as mad 
cow disease) and in crystal formation: 
Posner draws the analogy to a 1998 event 
when stocks of the AIDS drug Ritonavir 
began spontaneously converting to 
an alter 
nate, clinically ineffective crystal form. But 
a far more apt analogy?and a catastrophic 
one, albeit fictional?is to "Ice-9," the alter 
native crystal form of water with a melting 
point of 114? F that figures centrally in Kurt 
Vonnegut s novel Cat's Cradle. 
Although no stable strange matter has 
ever been observed, this scenario generated 
enough controversy around the startup of a 
new collider at Brookhaven National 
Laboratory in 2000 that groups at 
Brookhaven and the European laboratory 
CERN conducted risk assessments. Most 
experts regard a strangelet catastrophe as 
vanishingly unlikely on theoretical grounds, 
but the risk is extremely hard to character 
ize. In addition to theoretical arguments, 
both assessment teams also tried to estimate 
upper bounds for the probability empirically 
based on the event s not having occurred in 
the lifetime of the Moon and other bodies 
unshielded from cosmic radiation. The 
CERN team put the upper bound at 1 in 500 
million per year, the Brookhaven team at 1 
in 500,000 per year with two alternative 
cases of 1 in 50,000 and 1 in 500 billion 
under different assumptions (Sheldon L. 
Glashow and Richard Wilson 1999; Adrian 
Kent 2004). Since the Brookhaven collider 
began operation in 2000, no strangelet has 
been observed and subsequent work has 
strengthened the theoretical case that the 
catastrophic scenario is impossible (Jes 
Madsen 2000). Still, even proponents of 
large colliders acknowledge that doomsday 
scenarios cannot be definitively excluded 
and still more powerful colliders continue to 
be developed. 
The remaining two catastrophic risks, 
global warming and bioterrorism, are more 
widely known to most educated citizens, 
although not necessarily easier to character 
ize. Global warming is caused by emissions 
of infrared-absorbing gases from human 
activities, principally burning fossil fuels, 
which have raised the atmospheric concen 
tration of CO2 from 280 parts per million 
(ppm) before the industrial revolution to 
380 ppm today and are likely to increase it 
to 500 to 1000 ppm by year 2100. Since 
higher concentration of CO2 and other 
greenhouse gases 
warms the surface?an 
effect already evident in rapid warming 
since 1970?these increases are projected 
to bring further global-average warming of 
1.4 to 5.8?C by 2100. This is projected to 
bring many serious hydrological, ecological, 
and socioeconomic impacts, although the 
details of these are not well characterized 
and not all potentially serious mechanisms 
of impact are even identified. 
Even if global warming happens smoothly 
and incrementally, this range of projected 
change would appear to warrant concern. 
After all, even the bottom of the range is 
double the warming of the twentieth centu 
ry. The top of the range, about ten times the 
twentieth-century warming, would repre 
sent a change about as big (although in the 
opposite direction) as the difference 
between an ice age and today's climate. This 
range of changes does not worry Posner, 
however, who judges them too small to justi 
fy the cost of stopping them. Rather, he wor 
ries about several potential mechanisms of 
abrupt, extreme climate change 
or cata 
strophic impacts: large sea-level rise (5 to 6 
meters or more) from loss of major conti 
nental ice sheets in Antarctica or Greenland; 
sharp reduction or shutdown of the Atlantic 
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Ocean circulation that brings warm water to 
high latitudes and mild climates to western 
Europe; various positive feedbacks through 
which global warming could trigger massive 
release of naturally stored greenhouse gases, 
generating a runaway heating; or, in the 
opposite direction, various ways that global 
warming could so change the radiative prop 
erties of the atmosphere as to trigger rapid 
global cooling?bringing a new ice age or 
worse, a "Snowball Earth" in which ocean 
surfaces freeze from the poles to the tropics. 
Although prominent scientists have argued 
for the importance of considering such 
extreme and believed unlikely events 
(Wallace S. Broecker 1987; Michael 
Oppenheimer and Richard B. Alley 2005; 
Stephen Schneider, B. L. Turner, and Holly 
Morehouse Garriga 1998; Paul F. Hoffman 
et al. 1998), they are barely mentioned in 
official assessments (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change 2001b). No 
attempt has been made to characterize their 
probability in a risk assessment,2 and nor 
does Posner attempt to do so. 
Of the four risks considered, climate 
change has the most prominent policy debate 
and most acute public disagreement over its 
nature and severity. It consequently most 
strongly requires Posner to engage the poli 
tics and sociology of scientific knowledge, 
which he does offhandedly but mostly with 
good sense. He is appropriately scathing 
about the few climate contrarians for their 
sloppy argument, polemical tone, and prefer 
ence for forums where they do not face sci 
entifically informed criticism. He notes 
correctly that the seeming uncertainty and 
dissent in popular and policy outlets is belied 
by 
a 
strong consensus among scientists that 
global climate change is real, human-caused, 
and serious?and even reports his own infor 
mal survey of the scientific literature, in 
2 
Although for a highly instructive experiment in which 
a dozen eminent climate scientists were asked to do so 
anonymously, see M. Granger Morgan and David Keith 
(1995). 
which the consensus view outweighed even 
mild skepticism by 53 to 2.3 And he correct 
ly notes that scientific uncertainties broaden 
the distribution of potential climate futures 
in the direction of both higher and lower 
risks, and so (assuming risk aversion) typical 
ly support stronger action than best-guess 
point estimates. 
And yet in a few instances, Posner uncrit 
ically accepts contrarians' claims that even a 
little investigation or reflection would show 
to be preposterous, most strikingly the claim 
that scientists exaggerate the risks of climate 
change as a ploy to increase their research 
funding.4 This is nonsense. Climate-change 
activists advocate efforts to reduce emissions 
and adapt to the climate change we cannot 
avoid. Such efforts would require increased 
research funding for energy efficiency, non 
fossil energy sources, and carbon sequestra 
tion, but not for climate science. In a 
budget-constrained world, such a program 
would probably reduce, not increase, cli 
mate-science research. Consequently, when 
climate scientists join these calls for action to 
limit climate change, they act against their 
own professional interests. To most effec 
tively increase funding for climate research, 
an opportunistic researcher should argue 
that the risks are not well enough established 
to warrant action, so we need more climate 
research to decide whether and how to act. 
But this is precisely the argument being 
advanced by the contrarians, not the main 
stream climate scientists and activists whom 
they denounce. 
For his fourth risk, in case you are not 
scared enough, Posner turns to bioterrorism. 
Biological weapons produced for terrorist 
purposes could be far more devastating than 
either chemical or nuclear weapons, or natu 
ral pathogens. A bacterium or virus with 
3 This exercise essentially repeats the larger exercise of 
Naomi Oreskes (2004). 4 This charge has been widely made, most famously in 
Michael Orientons polemical novel State of Fear (2005). 
It was most recently advanced in a Wall Street Journal op 
ed on April 12, 2006 (Richard Lindzen 2006). 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 10:02:05 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
152 Journal of Economie Literature, Vol XLV (March 2007) 
ideal killing properties?a high mortality 
rate, a long infectious incubation period, and 
efficient airborne transmission?and for 
which there was no effective vaccine or 
treatment, could potentially kill most or all 
people on Earth. While naturally occurring 
organisms are unlikely to grow this lethal?if 
you are a bacterium, it is not advantageous to 
kill your entire host population?genetic 
manipulation of existing disease organisms 
(e.g., smallpox or other pox viruses, or the 
hemorrhagic viruses Marburg and Ebola) 
could, in principle, produce new bugs this 
bad. While the specific difficulties of creat 
ing an effective bioterrorist agent are not 
well known (at least publicly) and may be 
severe, general capabilities for the required 
types of genetic manipulation are widely dis 
persed. About ten countries are known or 
suspected to have bioweapons programs, 
and terrorist organizations have tried to 
develop them. Suitable lab facilities exist in 
dozens of countries. 
3. How to Think About These Risks: A 
Proposed Analytic Framework 
After characterizing these risks, Posner 
sets out his proposed analytic framework, 
which is basically cost-benefit analysis with a 
few heuristic extensions and approximations 
to handle the extreme and novel features of 
these risks. He is impressively bold and 
sometimes wildly arbitrary in estimating 
probabilities and consequences for purposes 
of argument?adopting or rejecting esti 
mates from prior sources 
as he pleases 
or 
making numbers up when 
none is available. 
The benefits of operating the contested col 
lider at Brookhaven Lab are $250 million 
per year, or alternatively zero; catastrophic 
global warming brings a permanent 20 per 
cent loss in Gross World Product; and so on. 
He then proposes four heuristic exten 
sions to a basic cost-benefit analysis frame 
work, although these differ greatly in how 
carefully he develops them and how much 
he uses them. The first, a sketch of a few 
alternatives to conventional discounting in 
trading off present and future consequences, 
is thinly developed and not subsequently 
used. The second, which Posner calls a 
"modest version of the precautionary princi 
ple," is less a method in his analytic frame 
work than a suggested bias in estimating 
costs and benefits. Based on several bodies 
of 
evidence?e.g., the weak observed associ 
ation of individual happiness with wealth, 
the increasing deflection of consumption 
into positional goods at high income levels, 
and risk aversion over healthy lifespan?he 
argues that the prospects for advancing 
human welfare by increasing consumption 
beyond present rich-world levels are slim. 
Consequently, increases in material wealth 
beyond this level are unlikely to outweigh 
any accompanying increase in catastrophic 
risks. This may well be correct, but Posner 
makes no attempt to sharpen the approach 
or even state clearly when he is using it. 
Perhaps it is embedded in the estimates of 
costs and benefits he uses throughout the 
book. He correctly criticizes the original 
Precautionary Principle as "too squishy," but 
this alternative is barely less so. 
The other two methods are developed 
more 
extensively and used at least to some 
degree in his subsequent analysis of the four 
risks. The third, which he calls "inverse 
cost-benefit analysis," involves rearranging 
the terms of a conventional risk analysis to 
put a bound on an unknown probability of a 
catastrophic risk. He compares actual 
annu 
al spending to avoid a risk with the loss that 
would be incurred if it happened and treats 
the ratio of these as an estimate of the annu 
al probability of occurrence that is implied 
by this spending level. If the probability so 
calculated is much smaller than the best esti 
mate of the true probability (assuming 
expected-value decision making and linear 
costs of risk reduction), then avoidance 
expenditures should be increased. 
This simple calculation is a variant of the 
"Hand rule," an early landmark of law-and 
economic reasoning from tort law (Learned 
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Hand 1947). In the case U.S. v. Carroll 
Towing, Judge Hand proposed that, under a 
negligence standard, an injurer should be 
liable for failing to take a precaution against 
a risk when the cost of the precaution is less 
than the expected value of the risk. Posner 
himself (Posner 1972) noted that when the 
Hand rule is interpreted as a relationship 
among marginal avoidance costs and dam 
ages, it motivates optimizing agents to make 
the socially optimal level of avoidance effort. 
But Hand's decision was famously ambigu 
ous on whether he intended the rule to apply 
to 
marginal or total effects. If to total effects, 
the rule gives optimality only under highly 
restrictive assumptions about the effect of 
avoidance efforts. If expenditure on avoid 
ance E is assumed to reduce the probability 
P of a fixed loss L, then the Hand rule in 
total effects (i.e., requiring E = P*L) pro 
duces optimality only if P(E) is of unit elas 
ticity everywhere, i.e., P(E) =k*E~l. Even 
assuming a constant-elasticity (but not uni 
tary) relationship P(E) = k 
* 
E~a, the ratio 
EIL at the optimum is not P but a*P. This 
makes sense: if the effect of spending to 
reduce P is small, we will want to spend less, 
for a given L. 
In this book, Posner's inverse cost-benefit 
criterion clearly compares total, not marginal 
effects. Consequently, if taken as a precise 
decision criterion, it gives socially optimal 
outcomes only under the highly restrictive 
assumption of unit elasticity in risk reduction. 
On the other hand, Posner states the condi 
tion very loosely: he proposes it only for 
order-of-magnitude comparisons between 
EIL and P to give guidance on the direction 
? should be changed. Moreover, he makes 
no reference to the dependence of P on E, 
stating single order-of-magnitude estimates 
for the probabilities of his four risks with no 
mention of how these might be being 
reduced by the avoidance efforts already 
being made, or be further reduced by addi 
tional efforts. The optimal expenditure on 
reducing these risks might in extreme cases 
be far from that implied by Posner's inverse 
cost-benefit condition. For example, a risk 
might be catastrophic, but if no available 
measure can reduce its probability then the 
optimal level of avoidance expenditure is 
zero. Alternatively, avoiding some risk might 
be so easy that it can be reduced to zero by 
expenditures much less than its initial expect 
ed value. Despite this sloppiness, we might 
be tolerant in assessing this rule of thumb 
since Posner acknowledges he does not 
address the cost or effectiveness of specific 
responses to his four risks and only uses this 
inverse benefit-cost criterion for order-of 
magnitude comparisons between numbers 
that are far 
apart. 
It is in valuing lives that Posner makes his 
strangest proposal. He endorses the 
stan 
dard literature?which values a rich-world 
statistical life at a few million dollars based 
on people s observed willingness to buy and 
sell small risks?but proposes a hundred 
fold reduction in this value when dealing 
with probabilities of death smaller than 10~6. 
Note that the proposal is not for a reduction 
in 
willingness to pay to avoid risk, which 
decreases in proportion to the risk given a 
constant value of life, but for a reduction in 
the value of life?i.e., the willingness to pay 
per unit risk reduction. Three points are 
advanced to support this adjustment, but 
none of them is remotely persuasive. First, 
he argues that the literature on observed 
risky choices does not include such small 
risks?but its hard to imagine how it could 
since even with constant $5 million value-of 
life the sums involved would be a few dollars 
or less, and this provides no affirmative evi 
dence for the proposed reduction in value of 
life. Second, he argues that studies of risk 
perception show people tend to ignore small 
risks?but in fact, as he acknowledges a few 
paragraphs later, the result is more ambigu 
ous. People tend to ignore subthreshold 
probabilities unless the risks in question 
have some other attributes that draw atten 
tion to them?e.g., they are unknown, 
uncontrollable, or dreaded?in which case 
they tend to be overestimated. Finally, he 
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argues that willingness to accept risks and to 
pay to avoid them vary nonlinearly as risks 
grow large, and so by analogy might also vary 
nonlinearly at small risks. But the nonlinear 
ity at high risks emerges from consistent util 
ity formulations that converge to a constant 
value of life for all risks below some proba 
bility bound, typically of order 10"3 (Ronald 
A. Howard 1980). Thinking coherently 
about how to respond to extremely low 
probability, high-consequence events may 
pose many difficulties, but this quick-fix 
does not help. Fortunately, Posner only uses 
this strange reduction in value of life to pro 
vide lower-bound values for the two most 
unlikely risks he considers, a 10-kilometer 
asteroid strike and the strangelet scenario. 
Since he concludes in each case that 
increased protection efforts are warranted, 
replacing his arbitrarily reduced value of life 
with a more conventional value would only 
strengthen the conclusion. 
4. Back to the Four Risks: How Does the 
Framework Help? 
Whatever consistency of analytic 
approach Posner has achieved, it quickly 
breaks down when he begins applying it to 
his four risks. The analysis of asteroid 
impacts is the most straightforward and, 
except for a couple of minor points, the most 
persuasive. He states that about $4 million is 
presently spent annually to assess and avoid 
the risk. Using his reduced value of life, he 
estimates the cost of a 10-km asteroid extinc 
tion event as $600 Trillion: 6 billion deaths, 
doubled to account for future lives not lived, 
at $50,000 per life. The inverse cost-benefit 
heuristic then implies an annual probability 
of about 1 in 100 million?similar to actual 
estimates of the probability of such a strike, 
so this level of expenditure may be about 
right. But the answer changes when a less 
catastrophic but more likely event is consid 
ered, a two-kilometer strike that kills 1.5 bil 
lion people, with an annual probability of 
about 1 in 250,000. Because the probability 
of this catastrophe is greater than 10~6, 
Posner now uses the more conventional $2 
million per life, giving a total cost of $3 
quadrillion. The inverse cost-benefit 
heuristic now implies an annual probability 
of about 1 in 800 million?three orders of 
magnitude smaller than the estimated prob 
ability of such a strike. He concludes that we 
should be spending more to assess and 
respond to this risk. 
This conclusion appears persuasive, and 
becomes even more so if we reject Posners 
reduced value of life for the larger and rarer 
event and so increase its cost a hundred-fold. 
The distribution of risks is sufficiently well 
characterized that the only difficulty in 
assessing them is deciding how to value low 
probability, catastrophic outcomes at the tail 
of the distribution. Whether these are evalu 
ated by their expected value or with risk 
aversion, the assessment leads to an easy 
decision to do more. This argument does 
not, of course, say what more should be done 
or how much of it, which would require 
detailed assessment of the cost and effec 
tiveness of specific risk-reduction measures. 
Posner supports two existing proposals to 
deploy new telescopes dedicated to finding 
and tracking all potentially threatening 
objects. An effective response to manage 
this risk would also of course require devel 
oping the capability to deflect objects that 
appear to pose high risks, on which nothing 
is being done at present. But abstracting 
from these important practical matters, the 
conclusion that more should be done 
appears clear. 
His analysis of the strangelet scenario is 
more problematic. Disregarding "moderate" 
catastrophes to focus exclusively on total 
annihilation of the Earth, Posner once again 
uses his reduced value of life to put the cost 
of this event at $600 trillion?the same as 
the cost of a large asteroid strike because, 
In this calculation, deaths are not doubled to account 
for future lives not lived, because this event does not end 
humanity. 
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from the perspective of human society, it is 
the same event: annihilation is annihilation. 
A more conventional value of life estimate, 
as for the asteroid, would increase the cost of 
this event 40 to 100 times, depending on 
how the wide variation of world wealth is 
reflected in the estimate. 
Posner asserts that nothing is being spent 
to reduce this risk. This is somewhat unfair, 
since at least the cost of the assessments 
should be counted, and possibly the cost of a 
small delay in starting up the Brookhaven 
collider, but these are still very small num 
bers, perhaps of order $100,000 to a few mil 
lion. Assuming, on the high side, that 
avoidance-related expenditures are $1 mil 
lion per year during the accelerator s operat 
ing life, the implied maximum probability of 




actually zero, the 
implied probability is of course zero. 
Here, however, the inverse cost-benefit 
heuristic is not particularly useful. Even 
ignoring the difficulty of assigning a mone 
tary value to the obliteration of the Earth, 
the analysis of this risk turns on the balance 
between two other numbers, both of them 
profoundly squishy: the societal benefits of 
operating the collider and the probability of 
the 
catastrophe. 
Posner initially puts the benefits at $250 
million per year of operation, then later 
reveals he believes the true value might be 
near zero or even 
negative. If only material 
economic benefits are counted, this range 
sounds plausible. Doubtless some would 
argue the number should be substantially 
higher?perhaps $1 billion per year, not 
$250 million?but Posners modified pre 
cautionary principle reminds us to be cau 
tious about expansive estimates of material 
benefits because even todays rich-world cit 
izens may be well into the region of dimin 
ishing marginal benefits from consuming 
more and better stuff. In Posners initial 
analysis, the colliders present-value cost is 
$1.7 billion, giving a net present-value bene 
fit of $400 million if benefits are $250 mil 
lion per year of operation. Estimating the 
annihilation risk at $500 million ($600 tril 
lion cost if it happens, 10~7 probability per 
year,6 summed 
over a ten-year operating 
lifetime and discounted at 3 percent) 
reduces the project's net present value to 
minus $100 million. But these numbers are 
all so labile that it is easy to make defensible 
changes in them to reverse the conclusion. If 
you, like Posner, think the social benefits of 
the facility small?after all, this research is 
remote from practical application and serves 
largely to indulge national pride and the 
intellectual passion of a tiny elite group? 
you only need reduce annual benefits from 
his $250 million to $200 million to conclude 
the collider should not be built, without even 
considering its risks. If you include the risk 
but use the upper-bound probability esti 
mate of the CERN assessment, 1 in 500 mil 
lion per year, the present value of the risk is 
only $10 million, so the collider should be 
built provided its social benefits are at least 
$190 million per year. The risk could be fur 
ther reduced to only $10,000 by using the 
smallest estimated upper-bound from the 
Brookhaven analysis. Eschewing loosely 
defined upper bounds in favor of best-guess 
point estimates could similarly reduce the 
weight of the catastrophe risk, while using 
more conventional value-of-life figures 
would increase it. 
This project of blue-sky quantification does 
provide the salutary discipline of making you 
ask about the societal benefits of such a 
research facility, attempting to characterize 
the nature of the risks it poses, and affirming 
that the scientific enterprise?when it con 
sumes vast public resources and imposes 
public risks?is legitimately subject to public 
control. But the project is likely to be of little 
help in bringing either increased rationality or 
increased tractability to making the decision, 
6 This is Posner's interpolation between the two team's 
estimates using an early draft of the Brookhaven study 
that put the middle estimate at 1 in 5 million, instead of 
the later revised 1 in 500,000. 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 10:02:05 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
156 Journal of Economie Literature, Vol XLV (March 2007) 
both because of the extreme malleability of 
the numbers and?crucially?because the 
only evident way to limit this risk is to close 
down or sharply restrict the associated areas 
of scientific research. Such a decision is not 
likely to turn on specific quantitative bal 
ancing of estimated risk and benefits, 
except to the extent that these are con 
structed after the fact to legitimize a deci 
sion already made on other grounds. 
Rather, it is likely to reflect a conflict 
between deeply conflicting ideas of desir 
able social goals?prudence and restraint, 
versus bold expansion in the pursuit of 
human knowledge and power. 
The analysis of global climate change is 
also problematic, but for less fundamental 
reasons than the analysis of the strangelet 
scenario. Although Posner identifies 
intertemporal trade-offs as the deepest con 
ceptual problem in assessing responses 
to 
climate change, he completely avoids this 
problem in his analysis, instead basing his 
conclusions on a series of ad hoc and rela 
tively unsupported estimates of the costs and 
benefits of slowing climate change. 
For impacts of climate change, he cites an 
estimate of $4 trillion present-value losses 
through 2105, based on a middle scenario of 
baseline emissions and climate sensitivity 
under which the Earth warms 2.4?C by 
2105. After criticizing this estimate as 
probably too low, he recasts it 
as an estimate 
of the impact of incremental climate 
change?not what the authors of the origi 
nal estimate meant, since roughly half of 
their figure consisted of willingness to pay 
to avoid a 1 percent risk of a catastrophic 
impact (defined as 22-44 percent GDP loss) 
associated with this 2.4?C warming sce 
nario. Having thus redefined this estimate, 
Posner proceeds to deem it negligible and, 
on that basis, argues that the entire standard 
7 William D. Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer (2000, p. 66). 
Posner also cites an estimate of $5 Trillion from Bj0rn 
Lomborg (2001, p. 310), but this is simply Lomborgs arbi 
trary adjustment of the same Nordhaus and Boyer esti 
mate. 
range of projected warming by 2100, 1.4 to 
5.8?C, can be neglected. 
Instead, he argues that our response 
should be determined by risks of abrupt and 
potentially catastrophic climate change, 
whose effect he estimates as a permanent 20 
percent reduction of GDP (a figure so small 
that it is not clear how this risk passed his 
initial screening to be considered a catastro 
phe). Discounted at 3 percent, this repre 
sents a present-value loss of $67 trillion for 
the United States. Comparing this to pres 
ent U.S. 
expenditures 
on climate change?a 
figure Posner misstates by counting only the 
~ $2 billion for climate-change science, not 
the ~ $3 billion for technology?his inverse 
cost-benefit heuristic suggests an annual 
probability for such catastrophic climate 
change as 1 in 39,000.8 Revising this calcu 
lation to include the correct current expen 
diture and displace the occurrence of 
catastrophic climate change a few decades 
into the future would reduce this implied 
probability to about 1 in 10,000 per year. 
What is our best estimate of this probabili 
ty? Several factors (e.g., increasing evidence 
of disruptions of major ice sheets and better 
characterization of past abrupt changes, as 
well as the expert surveys reported by 
Nordhaus (1994), Morgan and Keith 
(1995) and others, suggest it is more likely 
of order 1 in 1000 to several percent over 
this century?neatly bounding this correct 




sion is substantially weakened. Under the 
simple (and in this case, quite false) 
assumptions of linear mitigation costs and 
risk neutrality that underlie his inverse 
cost-benefit heuristic, present spending to 
limit this risk, might be about right or, under 
the most conservative assumptions of cata 
strophic risk, we might wish to spend up to 
ten times more?if spending is the way to 
solve the problem. 
8 An arithmetic error in the book reduces this proba 
bility by a factor of 10, to 1 in 388,000 (table 3.2, p. 182). 
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But in moving past this conclusion to con 
sider what should be done, Posner shifts 
even further away from his own analytic 
framework. His proposed response to cli 
mate 
change does not principally rely on 
public spending, but on regulation to moti 
vate private efforts to develop new energy 
technologies and cut emissions. In this, hav 
ing earlier rejected Nordhaus s estimates of 
climate impacts as too low, he proceeds to 
reject the corresponding quantitative esti 
mates of mitigation costs without even a 
mention. 
Rather, his proposal relies on a simple 
graphical analysis of the effects of a tax on 
greenhouse-gas emissions. He correctly 
frames the problem as motivating develop 
ment over several decades of the energy 
technologies needed to move away from 
emitting sources and argues for an emissions 
tax to achieve that. But his reasoning relies 
on a 
simple two-period model of market 
response to the tax, with an inelastic short 
term 
response and a more elastic long-term 
response. The inelastic short-term response 
means that the tax introduces only small 
allocative inefficiency, while providing 
strong incentives for the research and inno 
vation needed to reduce emissions in the 
long term, over which the response is 
assumed to be substantially more elastic. 
There are no specifics about how big a 
"substantial" carbon tax would be or how it 
would be structured, phased in, or varied 
over time. Moreover, the argument ignores a 
large literature on mitigation costs and their 
implications for the preferred stringency of 
mitigation policy. Emissions reductions are 
not free, and neither are the innovations that 
facilitate them, but these issues cannot be 
addressed in the framework of Posner's two 
simple response curves. Estimates of the cost 
of stabilizing the atmospheric content of 
greenhouse gases vary widely?e.g., from a 
few tenths of a percent to a few percent pres 
ent-value loss of future GDP to stabilize CO2 
at 550 ppm (double the preindustrial concen 
tration), a level often proposed as avoiding 
the worst risks of climate change 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2001a). These cost estimates are sen 
sitive to the assumed path of emission growth 
without intervention, the ease of substitution 
in the economy, and how revenues raised by 
a carbon tax are recycled through the econo 
my. Most important, mitigation costs depend 
strongly on assumptions about the conditions 
that drive innovation and technological 
change, which are not well modeled in cur 
rent 
analyses, and characteristics of markets 
for research and development, which are not 
considered at all. Still, how much we want to 
reduce and how fast must depend on these 
costs, as well as on the distribution of climate 
change impacts that can thereby be avoided, 
whether from incremental or abrupt change. 
Finally, there is bioterrorism. Posner pos 
tulates that the upper-bound catastrophic 
attack would bring 100 million U.S. deaths, 
for an estimated cost of $700 trillion ($7 mil 
lion per life), which he raises to $1 
quadrillion to account for collateral harms. 
Given present expenditures to reduce this 
threat of roughly $2 billion per year, his 
inverse cost-benefit heuristic gives a proba 
bility of two in a million per year. Well 
founded estimates of the probability of a cat 
astrophic bioterrorist attack are not avail 
able, of course, but I would guess it to be 
much bigger than this, perhaps in the 10~2 to 
10"4 range per year and so somewhat larger 
than that for acute climate change. Posner 
does not state his guess, but agrees that it is 
much bigger than two in a million and so 
concludes we should be doing more to avoid 
this risk, subject to the same qualifications 
that apply to all the risks about marginal ver 
sus total effects, and the effectiveness of 
risk-reduction measures. 
But doing what? Even more than for the 
other risks, this analytic framework is 
unhelpful in evaluating responses and decid 
ing what to do. Reducing this risk is not prin 
cipally a matter of spending money. Rather, 
proposed responses include increased police 
resources and powers, increased security 
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and control over certain areas of scientific 
research (e.g., who may engage in relevant 
areas of research? What elevated scrutiny 
must they accept into their affairs? How 
freely can the results of their research be 
communicated?), and broader limitation of 
civil liberties. Such measures are likely to be 
deeply contested, and the associated bur 
dens and harms especially resistant to mon 
etizing. Posner recognizes this, so without 
comment he abandons his analytic frame 
work entirely and instead relies on other 
arguments specific to this risk. 
In some points, his argument is quite com 
pelling. Clearly, decisions what to do about 
this risk must reflect a balancing of liberty 
interests (both general liberties, and the free 
dom of scientific inquiry) against security 
interests. This debate has not been adequate 
ly engaged since the 2001 terrorist attacks 
that raised general concern about terrorism. 
Moreover, one can easily find scientists who 
too quickly presume that complete liberty of 
their enterprise (with the possible exception 
of acts of voluntary self-regulation, such as 
the 1975 Asilomar guidelines on recombi 
nant DNA research) is a fundamental 
requirement of a free society, regardless of 
the consequences?a claim that has substan 
tial and underacknowledged elements of self 
interest, and could well be false. Here is one 
point where Posner's perspective as a lawyer 
is helpful in cutting through potentially dan 
gerous scientific vanity. He may 
even be cor 
rect, although his tone is unnecessarily 
contemptuous, that the inadequacy of this 
debate in part reflects the inability of civil 
rights advocates to understand the gravity of 
the security threats at issue, or their unwill 
ingness to consider the trade-off. Indeed, 
they may not even recognize how much civil 
rights interest there is in reducing the risk of 
catastrophic terrorist attack, because such an 
attack would surely be followed by restriction 
of liberties far more severe than anything 
presently being proposed or attempted. 
But Posner's argument here 
is so one 
sided that he neglects another pathology of 
current debate that is of potentially equal or 
even greater importance?that security 
advocates have also failed to show they 
respect civil liberties, or can be trusted to 
pursue security interests with due regard for 
minimizing encroachments on liberties. 
These issues have become so entrained in 
broader, ideologically charged conflicts that 
there has been no room for the considered 
balancing of legitimate contending values 
that Posner seeks. Such a debate would have 
to be informed by a sophisticated under 
standing of the effectiveness of various spe 
cific measures at reducing terrorism 
risk?requiring that, at least in important 
parts, the debate could not be fully public 
but would have to take place behind a secu 
rity screen. This poses deep questions of 
how, or even whether, a process could be 
designed that allows serious regard for liber 
ty interests as well as security ones. There 
appear to be no obvious answers to this. 
While I am sympathetic to Posner s conclu 
sion that some enhancement of police pow 
ers and limitation of recently enjoyed civil 
and scientific liberties may be warranted, I 
am deeply skeptical about who to trust to 
take these decisions with competence, 
integrity, and respect for both sets of values. 
5. Overall Assessment and Conclusions 
Seeking to assess the book in Posner s own 
spirit?overlooking its many small flaws and 
irritations and focusing on the large-scale 
argument?how does it stack up? Three of 
his broadest claims?that we face certain 
real risks with potentially catastrophic out 
comes, that these do not get enough atten 
tion relative to their gravity, and that there is 
a good case for doing more than we are to 
respond to them?are all persuasively made. 
Merely introducing these, and noting the 
structural factors that impede clear recogni 
tion and response to them, are significant 
contributions. But Posners program goes 
further than this and, as it does, it becomes 
progressively weaker. The most important 
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TABLE 1 
Major Attributes of Four Catastrophic Risks 
Risk 
P (Civilization- Relation of 
Ending Is Even Sci-Tech 
Catastrophe) Worse Advance Nature of 
per Year_Possible? Cause_to Risk_Response 
Challenges to 
Assessment 
Asteroid 10~7 - lO^8 Yes 
Strangelet ?T5 
- HT12? Yes 




Climate 10-3-Kr5? ??? Avoidable Cure and 
by-product of Indirect Cause 
human numbers 
and prosperity 
Bioterror ?O^-IO"4? No?? Scientific Necessary Part 
of Cause, May 
Contribute to 




Public spending on 
monitoring and 
deflection 

























partisan bias in 
cost estimates; 
Severe: What kind 
of society (now)? 
Need assessment 
process that is 
both trusted 
and secret 
failings of the book are that it only develops 
the proposed common analytic framework as 
a sketch so rough as to be nearly useless, and 
that it does not make the case that the pro 
posed framework gives common useful 
insights into how to respond to all these 
risks. 
There are important differences among 
these risks, in their origins, their distribu 
tions of potential consequences, the pro 
posed responses to them, and the factors 
determining a preferred response. Table 1 
summarizes several of these potentially 
important differences. These risks do, of 
course, have in common a catastrophic 
upper limit, so considering them together 
generates an impressive level of shock and 
morbid fascination, but even in their cata 
strophic character there are important dif 
ferences. Posner is not consistent in defining 
the threshold of a catastrophe, and the worst 
imaginable outcomes of these risks differ 
widely. The catastrophes considered range 
from 20 percent world GDP loss, through 
destruction of advanced civilization, to the 
destruction of all people, all complex life, or 
the Earth itself. (For what its worth, my 
view is that the most salient breakpoint for 
defining "global catastrophe" is the destruc 
tion of advanced civilization, not the exter 
mination of the remaining hungry bands.) 
Moreover, for some of these risks, partic 
ularly climate change and bioterrorism, the 
catastrophic tail might not be the most 
important part of the distribution. For any 
risk, it is the joint variation of probability 
and consequence that matters, not the mere 
existence of non-zero probability beyond 
some extreme threshold. The most obvious 
measure of severity is the contribution to 
expected losses, the integrated product of 
probability and consequence, for which the 
largest values may lie at intermediate out 
comes for some of these risks?mild to 
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at some extreme 
ly destructive upper limit may not suffice to 
bring these under common analytic frame 
work, or provide a consistent approach to 
assessing responses. 
Posner recognizes the limits of his frame 
work implicitly, since he makes little attempt 
to use it consistently across the four risks. 
The only piece he attempts to apply to all is 
the inverse cost-benefit heuristic, but even 
this he deploys inconsistently?applying it to 
widely and seemingly arbitrarily different 
degrees of catastrophe?and it provides only 
the most limited of insights: in each case, it 
merely demonstrates that we should be 
doing more, under highly restrictive assump 
tions and with no guidance regarding how 
much more or more of what. 
Where then does the argument of the 
book leave us in terms of judging what to do 
about these four risks? Asteroid impacts?a 
natural hazard, albeit one that includes more 
extreme outcomes than any other?are once 
again the easiest of the four. The case for 
doing more is clear, and deciding what to do 
is a matter of efficiently allocating public 
expenditure for risk avoidance. The only dif 
ficulties in deciding on a response are the 
technical problem of choosing effective, low 
cost measures, and the political problem of 
paying for what is clearly a global public 
good. No other social values than economi 
cal risk reduction are implicated. Posner's 
discussion of factors that obstruct clear 
thinking about such extreme risks is of obvi 
ous relevance and he does a valuable service 
by raising the prominence of this risk. 
Assessing the strangelet risk and deciding 
what to do about it are substantially more dif 
ficult, and this is only partly because the 
probability of the event is so poorly charac 
terized. Because this issue makes us consider 
retreating from broad areas of scientific 
research, it also raises questions of grand 
scale and potentially great historical conse 
quences. What risks are we willing to accept 
for the pursuit of knowledge? Note that it is 
not the application of knowledge that is at 
issue, which would be more readily mone 
tized, for it is the act of investigation itself that 
makes the tiny risk of annihilation. Is gaining 
ever more fundamental knowledge?and the 
vision of future human civilization deploying 
ever-greater material power based upon this 
knowledge, expanding to colonize other plan 
ets and solar systems?one of the noblest 
human aspirations, or is it blasphemy (or is it 
something in between, perhaps irrelevant to 
human concerns)? Would choosing to limit 
scientific exploration on the basis of tiny risks 
signal a mature adoption of voluntary 
restraint and a turning of human endeavor 
toward the pursuit of justice, beauty, and spir 
itual 
exploration, 
or a return to the ascendan 
cy of ignorance and superstition? These are 
judgments of what kind of society we want to 
be and want to become long after those mak 
ing todays choices are dead. Individuals are 
likely to form these judgments based on deep 
and divergent emotional, moral, and spiritual 
commitments but we do not get to choose 
individually: because of the scale of the 
research endeavor and the scale of the risks, 
the choice is inevitably collective. 
Posner suggests that the choice is easy. 
This is true in terms of practical feasibility, 
since the scale and expense of the required 
research facilities brings the decision clearly 
under public control. Perhaps it is even easy 
to identify the preferred choice?e.g., if this 
case can somehow be narrowly delimited so 
it does not imply a broad historical choice 
between exploration and prudence. But 
Posner s flippant characterization of the fac 
tors favoring proceeding as a monetized 
value of material social benefits from the 
research fails to capture the essence of the 
problem. And it bears noting that the choic 
es that have been made, both in America 
and Europe, are contrary to the choice he 
judges so obviously preferable. Relative to 
the profound differences at issue in these 
choices, Posners calculations provide some 
help in framing the questions but none at 
answering them. 
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Of the four risks, climate change is the one 
for which Posner's definition of a catastrophe 
raises the most problems. By the criteria 
Posner states at the outset for defining glob 
al catastrophes, it appears clear at first glance 
that climate change should not have been 
included at all. Virtually all scientific and 
public discussion of abrupt or catastrophic 
climate change?and perhaps the most 
important part of the distribution?concerns 
events that are extreme relative to the 
benign experience of the past few centuries, 
such as severe multidecade droughts in 
water-constrained regions like the American 




event famously used in the Pentagon's 2004 
abrupt climate change scenario exercise 
(Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall 2003). 
But while any of these could be seriously dis 
ruptive, perhaps impoverishing for many 
people, they would likely fall far short of 
destroying advanced civilization. Rather, 
they are roughly consistent with the magni 
tude of effect Posner ascribes to catastroph 
ic climate change, 20 percent GDP loss. Can 
we imagine worse? Sure, but even the peo 
ple thinking seriously about abrupt climate 
change appear not to consider them 
(Schneider, Turner, and Garriga 1998). 
Unless we can persuade ourselves that these 
further extremes are not just imaginable but 
plausible, climate change might be the odd 
risk out. 
But wait a minute. Climate change is also 
the odd risk out because it has the most 
mature policy debate of any of these risks. 
There are two international treaties in force, 
targets and policies in place to reduce emis 
sions in dozens of jurisdictions, and a mas 
sive scientific advisory process grinding out 
authoritative assessments every few years 
(Andrew E. Dessler and Edward A. Parson 
2006). The liberty to consider unlikely 
extremes, to toss out estimates of their prob 
ability and consequences that are plausible 
but indefensible (these are not contradicto 
ry) as Posner does so readily, may well be 
precluded by the social and political con 
straints on debate that come into play when 
decisions with real stakes are on the table. 
Official assessments of climate change have 
been dominated by conservative, well sup 
ported mean estimates and projections. 
They do not even give serious attention to 
sub-catastrophic extremes such 
as Posner 
considers, or even to the top quarter of the 
standard range of projected changes, despite 
decades of unchallenged exhortations that 
these less likely but more consequential pos 
sibilities matter more for decision making 
than the means (Anthony Patt 2006). The 
professional costs of discussing potential 
pathways that are more severe but unlikely, 
or even of being at the high end of the stan 
dard projection range, can be substantial. 
The existence of these pressures to ignore 
speculative risks calls into question my judg 
ment above that climate does not belong 
because it lacks truly civilization-ending 
risks. After all, the catastrophic asteroid 
strikes and collider accidents we are dis 
cussing have probability estimates of 10~9 to 
10"12 per year. Can we really not imagine a 
civilization-ending climate scenario at this 
tiny probability? Are we this certain that a 
Snowball Earth or a Venusian inferno cannot 
happen? I doubt it. Ask a climate expert over 
a beer: I bet the response is that this is not 
the most important part of the distribution 
of climate consequences, but its there. 
Whether the focus is on moderate catas 
trophes or extreme ones?the 10~3 tail of 
serious disruption or the 10~6 tail of true glob 
al catastrophe?and certainly when the 
entire tail of the distribution is considered, a 
plausible case can be made, using simple 
heuristics like Posners inverse cost-benefit 
analysis, that more should be done. But 
again, what? As for the other risks, deciding 
what to do requires going into more detail 
than these simple heuristics can provide. In 
contrast to the other risks considered, there is 
both an active debate on what should be done 
about climate change and a great deal of early 
policy in place, such that all the important 
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questions lie at a level of specificity that 
Posner simply does not reach. 
Just as asteroids are a natural hazard only 
bigger, climate change is a problem of envi 
ronmental regulation, only bigger. Its reso 
lution lies in choosing some level of public 
expenditure, and some form of regulation of 
private actors, to mobilize the research and 
investment needed to move the world ener 
gy system away from emitting sources, 
effectively and at minimum cost. Posner's 
call for a substantial emissions tax to moti 
vate the required efforts is approximately 
right?although there are some respects in 
which an equivalent tradable-permit system 
would be preferable, and either instrument 
would have to be phased in gradually (but 
with a clear and credible commitment to 
future increases) to reduce premature capi 
tal abandonment. But this conclusion is nei 
ther new nor especially provocative, and it is 
so scant on essential specifics and so illegit 
imate in its supporting reasoning that it 
makes no contribution to the debate. 
Like the strangelet risk, but unlike (or less 
like) the asteroid and climate risks, respond 
ing to the threat of bioterrorism raises deep 
choices of what kind of society we want. But 
rather than pitting a tiny immediate risk of 
annihilation against a long-term vision of 
society's commitment to knowledge and 
exploration, this choice puts into opposition 
two primary social values right now: security 
and liberty. The threat arises from the com 
bination of specific types of scientific 
progress and malevolent human agency that 
turns the results of that progress to destruc 
tive ends. But unlike the strangelet, the rel 
evant scientific capabilities are cheap, widely 
dispersed, and tightly linked with beneficial 
applications. Because controlling the rele 
vant knowledge is close to impossible, the 
principal means to reduce the risk lie in 
security restrictions on both scientific and 
general freedoms. Posner's general quantita 
tive framework is no help in weighing these 
values, as he acknowledges. Rather, his 
rec 
ommendation depends on his intuition that 
the societal harm of restrictions on scientific 
and civil liberties is being greatly exaggerat 
ed by the champions of those liberties. 
Unfortunately, however, he resorts to dis 
paraging these advocates for ignorance, 
naivete, and special pleading, and appears 
not to recognize the symmetrical neglect of 
these liberties by champions of security or 
the acute difficulty of developing a process 
that consider both sides fairly. His conclu 
sion that we should make more efforts and 
accept more restrictions to reduce the risk of 
catastrophic terrorism may appear moder 
ately persuasive: when the consequences get 
big enough, consequentialism looks more 
attractive. But his specific prescriptions treat 
the most important categories of resultant 
harm with little respect, and he omits them 
entirely from his accounting of the costs we 
are 
already bearing to manage this risk. 
Consequently, his argument once again does 
little to advance the debate. 
Despite the variable persuasiveness of his 
specific proposals, Posner is correct that we 
face these risks and must decide what to do 
about them. Moreover, there are probably 
more of these coming. Asteroids may be the 
only natural hazard this big we face for a few 
billion years (lets hope so), but the other 
three risks are all driven in various ways by 
the advance of human science and its appli 
cation, from which other potential mecha 
nisms of destruction?new scientific 
accidents, new forms of environmental 
stress, and new opportunities for large-scale 
malice?are likely to flow. Consequently, 
guidance in how to think coherently about 
catastrophic-scale risks is urgently needed, 
both for these particular risks and for the 
others we may face in a few years or decades. 
Posner advocates an approach based on 
cost-benefit analysis, with bold guesses for 
numbers not available. But he follows his 
own advice extremely unevenly, frequently 
abandoning his analytic framework for ad 
hoc arguments specific to the characteristics 
of each risk. In my view, this is appropriate, 
given the disparate character of the risks and 
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the responses they require. But what does it 
mean for the broad claim that all these risks 
can be adequately assessed in a cost-benefit 
framework? There are two possibilities: 
Posner 
might be wrong about the applicabil 
ity of a cost-benefit approach to these risks 
or he might merely have failed in his own 
application of the approach. 
Could a more sustained and disciplined 
analysis of these risks in a cost-benefit 
framework adequately capture their impor 
tant characteristics and provide useful guid 
ance on how to respond to them? My own 
intuition is that it could for some of these 
risks, but not all. On the one hand, the mere 
fact of a risk having a catastrophic tail does 
not preclude the use of cost-benefit analysis. 
The extension of the approach to managing 
risks is well established, and it can accom 
modate various attitudes to extreme risks 
while providing salutary benefits of disci 
plined, structured assessment. So to the 
extent that the choices at issue involve pur 
suing public safety at acceptable cost, 
through cost-effective public expenditure 
and regulation?as appears to be largely the 
case for asteroids and climate change?the 
merit of a cost-benefit approach looks 
broadly persuasive. 
On the other hand, the other two risks 
considered here appear to raise fundamental 
collective choices of what kind of society we 
want, which have no evident similarity to the 
provision of market goods and services 
except that they are things people care 
about. Deciding what to do about unavoid 
able risks from scientific research inevitably 
raises society's commitment to knowledge 
and exploration, just as deciding what to do 
about terrorism?biological or other 
forms?raises the commitment to an open 
society, individual liberties, and privacy. 
There is no possibility of decentralized indi 
vidual choice in either case, since where cat 
astrophic risks are concerned, 
we are all 
truly in the same boat. And while each case 
clearly requires some form of weighing and 
balancing of the contending values?and in 
each case one can 
readily construct extreme 
hypothetical scenarios to make the preferred 
choice go either way?the assignment and 
aggregation of individual monetary willing 
ness to pay appears utterly inadequate as a 
representation of these contending values. 
One broad hint that this is the case comes 
from the fact that Posner does not even try 
to represent the choices in this way. 
Despite incompleteness of argument and 
weakness of execution, this book does a real 
service to identify and describe these risks, 
to highlight the fact that they are not getting 
the attention they warrant, and to pull them 
together to support a call for more serious 
consideration. Moreover, it is particularly 
useful to have a prominent conservative 
thinker doing this. Posners calls for more 
public expenditure and effort to manage cat 
astrophic risks, regulation of the emissions 
contributing to global climate change, and 
establishment of new, powerful international 
organizations to monitor and enforce envi 
ronmental agreements and to coordinate 
investigations and enforcement against 
potential bioterrorist threats, are all to the 
good. There is something to outrage every 
one in his recommendations, and that is like 
ly to be a useful spur to thought, even if 
Posner may be indulging some private fond 
ness for being outrageous and unpre 
dictable. But these are not the proposals of a 
conservative ideologue. Rather, they suggest 
a na?ve faith in the ability of honest analytic 
efforts to give useful insight into even the 
end-of-the-world risks. He proposes?and 
models?a bold willingness to compare 
diverse social values, to attempt to quantify 
benefits and costs even when only the crud 
est estimates are defensible, and to consider 
the possibility that new circumstances may 
call for limits on values that have been con 
sidered sacrosanct. But this broad program 
fails: he does not make the case for the com 
monality of these risks or for the general 
applicability of a cost?benefit framework in 
addressing them. Rather, the principal con 
tribution of the book?and it is a worthy 
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one?is to educate about these risks and to 
use the shock value of treating them togeth 
er to draw much needed attention to them. 
References 
Broecker, Wallace S. 1987. "Unpleasant Surprises in 
the Greenhouse?" Nature, 328(6126): 123-26. 
Crichton, Michael. 2005. State of Fear. New York: 
HarperCollins. 
Dessler, Andrew E., and Edward A. Parson. 2006. The 
Science and Politics of Climate Change. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Glashow, Sheldon L., and Richard Wilson. 1999. 
"Taking Serious Risks Seriously." Science, 402(6762): 
596-97. 
Hand, Learned. 1947. United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947). 
Hoffman, Paul F., Alan J. Kaufman, Galen P. 
Halverson, and Daniel P. Schr?g. 1998. "A 
Neoprotezoic Snowball Earth." Science, 281(5381): 
1342-46. 
Howard, Ronald A. 1980. "On Making Life and Death 
Decisions." In Readings on the Principles and 
Applications of Decision Analysis, ed. R. Howard 
and J. Matheson. Menlo Park, CA: Strategic 
Decisions Group, 483-500. 
Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change. 2001a. 
Climate Change 2001: Mitigation, ?d. B. Metz, O. 
Davidson, R. Swart, and J. Pan. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2001b. 
Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis, ed. J. T. 
Houghton, et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kent, Adrian. 2004. "A Critical Look at Risk 
Assessments for Global Catastrophes." Risk Analysis, 
24(1): 157-68. 
Lindzen, Richard. 2006. "Climate of Fear: Global 
Warming Alarmists Intimidate Dissenting Scientists 
into Silence." Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2006: A17. 
Lomborg, Bj0rn. 2001. The Skeptical Environmentalist: 
Measuring the Real State of the World. Translation. 
Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Madsen, Jes. 2000. "Intermediate Mass Stranglets Are 
Positively Charged." Physical Review Letters, 85(4): 
4687-90. 
Morgan, M. Granger, and David Keith. 1995. 
"Subjective Judgments by Climate Experts." 
Environmental Science ?- Technology, 29(10): 
468-76. 
Nordhaus, William D. 1994. "Expert Opinion on 
Climate Change." American Scientist, 82(1): 45-51. 
Nordhaus, William D., and Joseph Boyer. 2000. 
Warming the World: Economic Models of Global 
Warming. Cambridge and London: MIT Press. 
Oppenheimer, Michael and Richard B. Alley. 2005. 
"Ice Sheets, Global Warming, and Article 2 of the 
UNFCCC." Climate Change, 68(3): 257-67. 
Oreskes, Naomi. 2004. "The Scientific Consensus on 
Climate Change." Science, 306(5702): 1686. 
Patt, Anthony. 2006. "Dealing with Uncertainty: How 
Do You Assess the Impossible?" In Assessments of 
Regional and Global Environmental Risks, ed. 
Alexander E. Farrell and Jill J?ger. Washington, 
D.C.: Resources for the Future, 119-37. 
Posner, Richard A. 1972. "A Theory of Negligence." 
Journal of Legal Studies, 1(1): 29-96. 
Schneider, Stephen, B. L. Turner, and Holly 
Morehouse Garriga. 1998. "Imaginable Surprise in 
Global Change Science." Journal of Risk Research, 
1(2): 165-85. 
Schwartz, Peter, and Doug Randall. 2003. An Abrupt 
Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for 
United States National Security. San Francisco: 
Global Business Network. 
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Thu, 12 Dec 2013 10:02:05 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
